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BOOK REVIEWS/COMPTES RENDUS 
The VzHavilland Canada. Stoiy. Fred W. Hotson, Toronto, CANAV 
Books, 1983. Pp 244, illus., index, bibliography, ISBN 
0-9690703-2-2, $29.95. 
All of us know, or know where to find out, how an aircraft works. 
This is the first Canadian book that attempts to tell how an 
aircraft company works, through the vicissitudes of the last 
fifty years. While neither definitive nor unchallengable, it is 
essential for historians of current engineering. 
DHC's fortunes have varied between extremes, as indicated by the 
changing numbers on its payroll, from a few dozen in the Depres-
sion to 7000 in wartime, 3000 in the 1950s, 8000 briefly in the 
1960s and 4000 today. Hotson1 s account demonstrates the spe-
cifically Canadian character of change from the era before air-
lines, when DHC was founded as a repair shop and production line 
for British machines, to its becoming a Crown corporation in 
1974, supposedly as a temporary device until a suitable owner 
could be found. Management has been as important as changing 
markets in determining the shape and the behaviour of this firm, 
and presumably of Canadair as well. 
An example was DHC s purchase in 1962 of AVRO Canada's Malton 
plant, for no discernible reason other than that AVRO's managing 
director asked DHC1 s to do so. Only thereafter ddld DHC manage-
ment begin to consider what to do with a second factory as large 
as their own. The solution was to build Douglas airliner wings 
on contract, a financial disaster that led to McDonnell-Douglas 
purchasing the Malton plant and thus becoming an employer in 
Canada. 
It is surprising how often DHC seems to have acted capriciously 
or incompetenly. In wartime, orders were obtained for more than 
1000 Mosquito bombers for Britain, to be delivered by the end of 
1943. Although tooling up began in 1941, deliveries did not be-
gin until 1943 and no more than 646 aircraft were delivered to 
England by V-E Day. In order to get that many, C D . Howe took 
direct control of the DHC plant in 1943, removing its managing 
director and placing J. Grant Glassco in charge. In 1944 a 
model production-line was perfected, but it was too late for the 
purpose of the whole undertaking. 
In the early years, when deHavilland was a family firm, the Brit-
ish ownership was benign, providing free technology and demanding 
no dividends. The amalgamation in 1966 of Hawker-Siddeley—now 
British Aerospace Pic—changed all this. In 1968 the British 
proprietors ordered DHC to cease production of the Turbo-Beaver 
and in 1969 cancelled the DHC-7 (Dash-7), fired the president 
and replaced him with an American appointee. The Canadian gov-
ernment 'saved1 the firm as much in 197 0, when it made grants 
to continue work on the Dash-7, as by acquiring ownership in 
1974. 
These appear to be DHC's most spectacular aberrations from the 
norm of successful business. Hotson makes no judgements, but 
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simply presents the recorded and generally-known facts. The 
gist of his book reinforces impressions that the circumstances 
of high technology manufacturing in Canada are quite unique, 
and that these specific characteristics matter more than models 
derived from dissimilar conditions in other countries. The wheel 
of policy interests came full circle in 1984 with the recognition 
now given 'corporate culture1 as a factor in market success. 
This was precisely what the National Research Council attempted 
in vain to tell the Glassco and Lamontagne committees was pre-
requisite to successful research. This book1s view of the firm 
is that of a group of colleagues and friends, although hardly 
any of the individuals is presented as a three-dimensional per-
sonality. Nevertheless, Hotson, who joined DHC in 1935, demon-
strates throughout his narrative the essential function of the 
firm's social community in achieving technical successes as well 
as enough sales to keep the group in business. 
Another theme, faint but reiterated, is the relationship between 
research and sales, or knowledge and management—usually slighter 
than researchers or economists suppose. A telling sentence is: 
'DeHavilland had always worked closely in prewar days with Ot-
tawa's National Research Council on experimental projects. . . 
but when the war came such projects only complicated factory 
planning and interfered with production.' Only one of the para-
doxes of DHCs history is that is sold off its SPAR (Special 
Products and Aviation Research) division twenty years ago to 
enthusiasts who believed in its future when the firm's hierarchy 
did not. 
Tkd dtHavilland Canada Stony is typical 'insider' history. It is 
governed by participants' values and knowledge rather than his-
toriographie method or any outsiders' values. Thus, Hotson does 
not mention either the Science Council report on STOL aircraft 
of 1970 or the large government payments to DHC since 1974. He 
merely narrates what happened so far as the firm was concerned, 
that thee;government operated a STOL demonstration service with 
Twin Otters in 1974-76 and that the firm, almost incredibly, 
sought to make a long-range Arctic patrol aircraft out of its 
design for a short-range commercial airliner. 
Like most 'insider' authors, Hotson claims to leave analysis for 
those who specialize in it, in order to concentrate on the basic 
facts. But his love of the firm and the group show through, 
as they should, since his tacit thesis is that this social feeling 
was one of tte engines that made the whole enterprise go. Lacking 
such analysis, even the magnificent illustrations will probably 
not attract science policy specialists to this valuable book. For 
us historians, the book may be superseded in future but it is 
now essential. As one browses through the list of directors in 
an appendix, recognizing the names of prominent public officials 
with no personal experience in manufacturing or aviation, one 
cannot avoid the feeling that, had this book appeared a decade ago, 
DHC might be better situated today. 
Donald J.C. Phillipson 
